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T h r e e  C a n a d i a n  c a s e  s t u d i e s  s h o w  t h a t  t h e  m e d i a  a s s u m e  
g r e a t e r  p o w e r  i n  e m e r g e n c i e s  t h a n  a t  o t h e r  t i m e s .  T h e y  
d e c i d e  w h a t  t o  r e p o r t ,  w h a t  a g e n c i e s  t o  d e a l  w i t h ,  a n d  m a y  
e v e n  d e t e r m i n e  w h e t h e r  t h e r e  i s  a  d i s a s t e r .  
Troic Qtudes f a i t e s  au Canada dtab l i s sent  l e  f a i t  que, dans 
l e s  cas dlurgence, l e s  pouvoirs du monde du media s l a c c r o i s -  
sent  grandemment plus qu la td 'autres  temps. Les n;onde du 
mCdia choiset  ce qul il faut f a i s e  connaitre au public e t  en 
p a r t i c u l i e r ,  s ' i l  s  ' a g i t  d'une catastrophe ou non, e t  puis  
rapportent l e s  noms des bureaux q u ' i l  faut contacter.  
On C h r i s t m  Day, 1974, a cyc lone c a l l e d  Tracy devastated 
the nor thern A u s t r a l i a n  c i t y  of  Darwin, popu la t i on  45,000. 
When t h e  storm passed it l e f t  most homes dest royed,  t h e  r e s t  
damaged. A l l  u t i  1 i t i e s  -- pcwer, water, sewage, telephone -- 
were ou t .  Canmunications were i n  d i s a r r a v .  S i x t y - f i v e  p e r -  
sons were dead and a t  l e a s t  1,000 were in jured.-  ( ~ c a i l o n ,  
1980, 121 ) 
Because o f  t h e  devas ta t i on  and because Darwin i s  i n  A u s t r a l i a ' s  Nor- 
t h e m  T e r r i t o r y ,  d i s a s t e r  response was taken over by a f e d e r a l  govern- 
ment o f f i c i a l .  Once he had reviewed emergency hea l th  problems, he 
scught r e p a i r s  o f  the emergency r a d i o  system. He t o l d  h i s  aide: 
t o  i n s t r u c t  t h e  Natura l  D isasters  Organ izat ion i n  Canberra 
t o  acqu i re  and u r g e n t l y  b r i n g  i n  2,000 t r a n s i s t o r  
rad ios  ... most o f  t h e  a v a i l a b l e  rece i ve rs  had been 
destrcyed. ( S t r e t t o n ,  1976, 61 ) 
Radio mass communications was seen as e s s e n t i a l  t o  an adequate d i s a s t e r  
response. 
On November 10, 1979, when a t r a i n  d e r a i l e d  i n  t he  c i t y  of  M iss i s -  
sauga, On ta r i o ,  an evacuat ion was s t a r t e d  a f t e r  one ca r  had bleveed and 
it became known the re  were t o x i c  c t e m ~ c a l s  present such as s ty rene,  
t o luene ,  c a u s t i c  soda, propane and c h l o r i n e .  The agency respons ib le  
f o r  d i r e c t i n g  t h a t  evacuat ion was the Peel Regional Po l  i ce  Force. The 
p o l i c e  o f f i c e r  who was i n  charge o f  ope ra t i cns ,  a du ty  i nspec to r ,  came 
t o  the  scene as soon as he was n o t i f i e d .  H i s  f i r s t  concern was estab-  
1 i s h i n g  an adequate command p o s t .  H is  second --  t h e  media: 
w i t h i n  minutes a f t e r  he had estab l ished ccmmand post  ... began 
t o  make arrangements f o r  a media cen t re  and an o f f i c e r  t.o 
t ake  charge o f  it. (Scanlon and Padgham, 1980, 86) 
The t h r e a t  was s t i l l  be ing i d e n t i f i e d  bu t  t h e  media were a l ready a cen- 
t r a l  concern. 
On January 7 ,  1983, p o l i c e  responding t o  an acc iden t  just. ou ts ide  
Courtenay, B r i t i s h  Columbia, d ~ s c o v e r e d  the acc ident  invo lved an over -  
tu rned tanke r  t r a i l e r  which was l eak ing  propane. They began an imme- 
d i a t e  evacuat ion and r i g h t  f r a n  the  s t a r t  they t c l d  persons being 
evacuated they should 1 i s t e n  t o  l o c a l  r a d i o  i n  o rde r  t o  keep informed. 
W i th in  minutes, an o f f i c e r  a t  the scene requested h i s  detachment. t o  
request  t he  l o c a l  r a d i o  news d i r e c t o r  t o  come t o  t,he on-scene command 
post.  Radio was t o  be the  l i n k  t o  the  pub l i c  e s p e c i a l l y  those d i r e c t l y  
i nvo l ved .  
Surveys suggest t h a t  i n  t imes o f  emergency, people t u r n  t o  the  
e l e c t r o n i c  media, e s p e c i a l l y  r a d i o ,  f o r  i n f c rma t ion .  A study conducted 
by l va r t i n  Gold farb ,  consu l tan t  f o r  t h e  spec ia l  Senate Committee on Mass 
Media repor ted 76% of Canadians would t.urn t o  r a d i o ,  3 8 a o  t e l e v i s i o n  
i n  an emergency (respondents cou ld  g i v e  more than one answer) (Special  
Senate Committee on Mass Media, 1971, 43).  Dynes repor ted t.hat " r a d i o  
has a p a r t i c u l a r  advantage i n  d i s a s t e r  s i t u a t i o n s  because it i s  more 
f l e x i b l e  than t e l e v ~ s i o n  and more instantaneous than newspapers (Dynes, 
1970, 76).  C r i s i s  managers recognize t h a t  f a c t .  Whether i t  i s  a 
cyclone i n  A u s t r a l i a ,  a t r a i n  dera i lment  i n  On ta r i o  o r  a propane leak 
on Vancouver I s l and ,  t.he respons ib le  a u t h o r i t i e s  are concerned about 
adequate pub1 i c  i n fo rma t ion  and they see the media, espec ia l  l y  l o c a l  
r a d i o ,  as t h e  way t o  achieve that.  goa l .  
What we want t o  suggest i s  t h a t  t he  media -- wh i l e  they perfcrm 
t h i s  f u n c t i o n  -- a l so  do f a r  more. They do not. j u s t  rece i ve  o f f i c i a l  
i n fo rma t ion  ( f a c t s )  and pass it on. They decide which o f f i c i a l s  should 
be consu l ted and which i n fo rma t ion  should be passed on. They in teract .  
w i t h  t h e i r  audience t o  pass ou t  advice and guidance. They a l so  de f i ne  
t h e  parameters o f  an event and decide whose ve rs ion  o f  what happened 
w i l l  be accepted. They even determine by the  way they c o l l e c t  infcrma- 
t i o n  and c o l l a t e  it when a s i t u a t i o n  w i l l  be perce ived as a d i s a s t e r .  
And they se lec t  what wllT be included o r  l e f t  out.  
It i s  t rue ,  o f  course, the media do not  do a l l  o f  these th ings on 
a1 l occasions. Sanetimes emergencies occur where t h e r e  are no media. 
Sometimes, the impact of the d isas te r  e l iminates t h e  media t h a t  do 
e x i s t .  Sometmes, high-speed informal cofimunications beat media t o  t h e  
punch. Somet imes , a quick, e f f e c t i v e  and cc-ordinated emergency r e -  
sponse w i l l  make t h e  media fo l l owers  r a t h e r  than leaders, repor ters  
rather  than decis ion makers. But it i s  nevertheless t r u e  t h a t  dur ing 
an emergency when oth& communications channels are down and when media 
audiences are inc red ib ly  high and a t t e n t i v e  -- the media, espec ia l l y  
rad io ,  become very powerful ,  perhaps more powerful  than  a t  any other 
tine. 
As evidence i n  support of these statements we w i l l  review three 
case studies. Then kie w i l l  re fer  t o  a nunber o f  o ther  studies f o r  
f u r t h e r  e laborat ion.  
The f i r s t  study discussed i s  Singer and Green's (1972) examination 
of how a London rad io  stat.lon, CFPL, performed dur ing a snoustcrm 
aergency  i n  January, 1971 . The second takes a broader view o f  the  
r o l e  of the rr,edia; it deals w i th  the  f i r s t  January, 1982 Miramichi 
earthquake (Scanlon, Cixon, K C l e l  l an ,  1982). The t h i r d  reviews t h e  
performance o f  the media i n  the f a l l ,  1978, Terrace, B r i t i s h  Colunbia, 
f loods (Scanlon and Taylor,  1979). 
THE LONDON STORM 
-
On January 20, 1971 ,a severe snowstonn h i t  southwestern Ontario. 
Because o f  i t s  f e r o c i t y  the  storm and i t s  e f f e c t s  cou ld  be heard and 
seen by v i r t u a l  l y  everyone : 
Winds o f  100 mi les per  hour (161 k i l o m e t e r s )  hur led across 
Lake Huron, v i s i b i l i t y  diminished t o  e i g h t  f e e t  (2.4 meters) 
w i t h  temperatures as low as 15 below (-26 Cels ius)  ... The 
st reets  soon became t o t a l  l y  unusable f o r  vehicu lar  t r a f f i c  , 
w i t h  hundreds o f  cars stranded and abandonded on London's 
major s t ree ts .  ..Thousands of school c h i l d r e n  were stranded 
f o r  as long as two days i n  area schools ... The Premier o f  t h e  
province himself  was stranded a t  a serv ice s t a t i o n  on 
Highway 401 f o r  25 hours. (Singer and Green, 3 - 4 )  
Py m~d-af ternoon tha t  day, the c i t y ' s  most powerful  and most 
l is tened to .  rad io  s t a t i o n ,  CFPL, turned t o  an open l i n e  format: re- 
ceiv ing information, g i v ing  it out ,  answering quest ions, prov id ing 
reassurance: 
Radio provided the  communication t h a t  f a c i l i t a t e d  t h e  l i n k -  
up bet.ween Medway High School, i n  need of blankets, and 
res iden ts  of  Orchard Park.  ..The r a d i o  announcer t c l d  parents  
o f  school c h i l d r e n  n o t  t o  worry ,  'because w e ' l l  g e t  word t o  
you as q u i c k l y  as poss ib le '  . ..The announcer was asked t o  
reccmmend behavior i n  a v a r i e t y  o f  cases. The announcer 's 
advice was sought t o  t he  bes t  course o f  ac t i on  ... near l y  a l l  
t h e  announcers were ac t i on -o r i en ted  ... ' D o n ' t  t r a v e l '  . . . I  As- 
sume t h a t  a l l  meetings are cancel l e d '  . .. (Singer  and Green, 
26,  28, 3 7 ) .  
The importance o f  r a d i o  -- as seen by l o c a l  o f f i c i a l s  -- i s  demon- 
s t ra ted  by what happered when a c a l l e r  asked f o r  the o f f i c i a l  r u l i n g  on 
t h e  use o f  snowmobiles d u r i n g  t h e  a f termath o f  t h e  storm. 
The announcer was uncer ta in  ... he thus requested over the a i r  
t h a t  the mayor telephone him w i t h  t h i s  i n fo rma t ion  .. . the 
mayor complied. (S inger  and Green, 39) 
As Singer and Green conclude, a l l  these developments p u t  t h e  r a d i o  i n  a 
p o s i t i o n  o f  i n f l uence :  
Not o n l y  d i d  it cont inue t o  p rov ide  i n f o r r a t i o n  and 
enter ta inment  but  it took on the added r o l e  o f  moral  
a u t h o r i t y  and d e c i s i o n  maker f o r  an e n t i r e  popu la t i on .  It 
recommended behav ior ,  gave advice, served as a source o f  
assurance besides p rov id ing  general  mass i n fo rma t ion  .. . 
(Singer  and Green, 5 )  
I n e v i t a b l y ,  it a lso  c rea ted  some problems and concerns. A l l  messages 
were no t  checked o r  author ized;  the s t a t i o n  sometimes acted on i t s  own: 
A compl ica t ion over  t h e  use o f  snowmobiles ... r e s u l t e d  from 
op in ions g iven about t h e i r  usage w i thou t  any fc rmal  au tho r i -  
za t i on .  The Cent ra l  F i r e  S t a t i o n  was a l s o  faced w i t h  a 
problem when it was i m p l i  ed... t he  f i r e  s t a t i o n  would p rov ide  
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  f o r  nurses. They were bombarded w i t h  r e -  
quests.  .. (Singer  an3 Green, 41 ) 
The r a d i o  s t a t i o n  was n o t  j u s t  passing o u t  news. It had assumed a 
p o s i t i o n  of i n f l uence .  The c a l l s  t o  t he  f i r e  s t a t i o n ,  f c r  example, 
were a d i r e c t  r e s u l t  o f  p u b l i c  acceptance t h a t  t h e  s t a t i o n  had accurate  
in fc rmat ion.  
VIRAMICHI EARTHQUAKES 
-- ------ 
I n  one way, the f i r s t  Miramichi  earthquake (January 9 ,  1982) is  
d i r e c t l y  comparable t o  t h e  London snowstorm. Just  as t h e  storm ccu ld  
be heard and be seen, the earthquake could be heard and f e l t :  
My bed was shaking and p ic tures on the wa l l  were r a t t l i n g  ... 
I was j u s t  gone out t o  s t a r t  the  c a r ,  went i n t o  the  
bedroan. ..and the place s tar ted t o  shake. ..it was scary. 
There was a set  o f  g o l f  c lubs leaning against  t h e  w a l l  and 
they f e l l  down. The bui ld ing was heaving. (Scanlon, Dixon 
and McClellan, 1982, 5 )  
Yet despi te  these ind ica t ions  o f  earthquake a c t i v i t y ,  many d i d  n o t  know 
what was going on. The las t  severe earthquakes f e l t  i n  N e w  Brunswick 
were i n  1925 and 1929: persons had no recent earthquake experience t o  
draw on. 
... The house s t a r t e d  shaking. It looked l i k e  t h e  wind was 
blowing outside. Thought it was the t r a i n  going by. It 
usua l l y  shakes t h e  house. I thought t h e  army t r u c k  outs ide 
blew up ... 
I d i d n ' t  know what t o  t h i n k .  What scared me was no t  knowing 
what it was and how long it would l a s t .  .. (Scanlon, Dixcn 
and VcClel lan, 1982, 5 )  
Convinced t h a t  whatever had happened, it had happened t o  them, some 
persons ca l led  the l o c a l  emergency agencies repor t ing a furnace explo- 
sion o r  a b u i l d i n g  about t o  co l lapse  ( there was ac tua l l y  r e l a t i v e l y  
l i t t l e  damage anywhere). I n  Bathurst ,  N e w  Brunswick, f o r  example: 
There were a l o t  o f  c a l l s  t o  t h e  f i r e  department .. .and a 
f l ood  of c a l l s  to the po l i ce  ... Many o f  the c a l l s  demanded an 
emergency response.. .the c a l l s  so f looded the downtown 
(telephcne) exchange t h a t  it busied o u t '  f o r  h a l f  an 
hour. .. (Scanlon, Dixon and McClel lan, 1982, 14) 
The emergency agencies rea l ized they were deal ing w i th  an earthquake 
( the  range and v a r i e t y  of c a l l s  made it evident  t h e  problem was wide- 
spread) but they could not  t e l l  how severe it was o r  where it was 
centered. It was poss ib le  the re  were severe problems n o t  being repor- 
ted -- they began t o  seek expert advice. The media were also f lccded 
w i th  c a l l s  -- they began t h e  same search. 
Ncrmally, i n  New Brunswick, c r i s i s  in fcrmat icn can be expected t o  
come from EMO, the p rov ince 's  Emergency Measures Organization. The 
organizat ion had gained a great  deal c f  c r e d i b i l i t y  i n  a previous 
emergency (Kueneman, 1973, 193). This t ime  EM0 had i t s  problems. It 
had no in te rna l  exper t ise and it was having d i f f i c u l t y  acqui r ing some 
e l  sewhere. Though it managed t o  get  through t o  t h e  federa l  department 
of Energy, Wines and Resources (EMR) i n  Ottawa, it was not t reated as a 
p r i o r i t y  c l i e n t :  
EMO, as a p r o v i n c i a l  agency, does n o t  have nomal  contact 
w i th  persons i n  a federa l  department i n  Ottawa. There was 
no established pattern o f  communication. ..the sc ient is ts  
( a t  EMR) did not t r e a t  EM0 as a matter of high priori ty.  
(Scanlon, Dixon and McClellan, 1982, 20) 
Normally, EM0 would have reached EMR through the federal emergency 
planning establ ishment , EPC, Emergency Planning Canada. B u t  the EPC ' s  
regional d i rec tor ' s  post in New Brunswick was vacant; the back-up 
person in Prince Edward Island was involved in earthquake response 
there,  and the  special off hours link between EM0 and EPC could not be 
made to work. 
Plthough EMR was slow in responding t o  EMOLs inquiries, i t  was not 
as slow in responding to the media. As is always the case, i t  provided 
quick and detailed information t o  CP, the Canadian Press, the main 
Canadian news service. This was prcmptly relayed to  al l  CP c l ients  
(through Broadcast News) including a l l  radio stat ions in New Brun- 
swick. EMR provided the same infcrmation to a physicist a t  the Univer- 
s i ty  of New Brunswick ( U N B )  in Fredericton, the c i ty  where EM0 i s  
located. The sc ient is t  pranptly passed on what he had learned (he had 
the same information as the media) to  local ca l lers  including the 
media and Em. He had become the important local source and , as such, 
drew attention away from the the established emergency agency, EMO. 
Armed with th i s  information and with similar though sl ightly different 
information from the U.S. earthquake centre in Golden, Colorado -- the 
local media began to broadcast what they were told. This included both 
the magnitude of the earthquake -- a f a i r l y  severe 5.5 t o  5.9 on the 
Richter scale -- and i t s  approximate epicentre near the small town of 
Plaster Rock, hew Brunswick. 
Given the  apparent conf 1 i c t  between the U.S. and Canadian data -- 
the U.S. said 5.9, and Canada 5.5 -- the media also became selective. 
They gradually dropped the U.S. magnitude -- 5.9 -- in preference of 
the Canadian one -- 5.5. They also began to use the i r  main source the 
physicist in Fredericton instead of a more distant  source EMR Ottawa or  
Golden, Colorado. A key news value -- lccalize the story -- determined 
the shape and source of what was being reported. The national CP 
reports a l l  originated f r a  Halifax, an Atlantic news centre. 
Although the Golden estimate and the Ottawa estimate were not 
really that  f a r  apart (both were preliminary, the two were regularly in 
contact and the two revised versions tend t c  coalesce), the New Bruns- 
wick experience indicates that  the media can and do shape the defini- 
tion of an incident not just f o r  the public, but even fo r  the  agencies 
responsible for emergency response. 
The impcrtance of media becomes more clear when police operations 
in Fredericton are examined. When police were unable to  get information 
about possible earthquake impact from any other source (they had t r ied  
EM)) they turned on local radio and listened to find out what was 
t appen i ng . 
Thcugh i t  was hard to pin down precisely, there was at  least some 
evidence the experience with the f i r s t  earthquake affected the way the 
media dealt  with subsequent ones. Because they learned t h a t  Gclden and 
EMR and the local physicist were available with information and EM0 was 
not, the media turned away fran Em) as an earthquake disaster  source. 
If an agency wants t o  be treated as important during an 
emergency, then i t  must be certain i t  will be able to ope- 
ra te  during tha t  emergency and that  operation will include 
the ready availabil i ty of whatever information is likely t o  
be asked f o r .  (Scanlon, Dixon and McClellan, 1982, 30) 
THE TERRACE FLOODS 
The London snow emergency was recognized imrediately for  what i t  
was. The Miramichi earthquakes were widely f e l t  though the i r  shape and 
location was not so easily determined. The Terrace floods are differ-  
ent again. I t  took a build-up of several days and an intervention by 
the media before the events of  late October -- early Navenber, 1978, 
were perceived as a disaster .  
The problems around Terrace started a t  4:00 p.m. Monday, October 
30, when the area began to experience a record ra infa l l .  In the twenty- 
four hour period (10:00 p.m., Monday t o  10:OO p.m. Tuesday) there were 
116.8 millimeten of rain,  an a l l  time record. In just  one hour on 
Tuesday (7:OO t o  8:00 a.m.) the area received 9.6 mil limeters of rain.  
And the rain did not stop. Between 10:OO p.m. Tuesday and 10:00 p.m. 
Wednesday, the rainfall  was so heavy -- 89.1 millimeters -- i t  would 
have been a record if n u t  for  the previous day. In addition, the 
weather was unseasonably warm. From Sunday, October 29, unti l  Wednes- 
day, Novenber 8 -- ten days -- the thermometer never dropped below the 
freezing point. The snow on the mountains steadily melted (Scanlon and 
Taylor, 1979, 9;  Scanlon, 1980b, 254 - 263). 
The result  was a rapid build-up of the flow of water in mountain 
streams. The flow rate in the Zymagotitz, for example, went fran a 
normal 573 cubic f e e t  per second t o  18,700 cubic f e e t  per second. The 
major r iver,  the Skeena, grew fran the normal 19,500 cubic fee t  per 
second t o  150,000 cubic f e e t  per second. As if  t h i s  was not enough, 
there were also unusually high winds; winds that  gusted tfi more than 
eighty ki lometres per hour on Wednesday afternoon (November 1 s t ) .  
I t  might be thought t h a t  t h i s  situation would lend to a perception 
of imminent d isas ter  and t o  a growing readiness f o r  a d isas ter  respon- 
se. This did not happen. For cne thing, disaster  planning was confined 
to  the main c i t y ,  Terrace, and Terrace was never actually threatened. 
(Local emergency off ic ia ls  had kept a close watch on the Skeena and 
were certain i t  would not overflow; i t  did not.) Second, perhaps more 
impcrtant, various agencies -- the railway, highways, power, telephone, 
the gas company -- dealt with the growing problems as internal matters, 
treating them as isolated incidents: 
One anecdote i l lus t ra tes  the extent of the isolation: a 
passenger t ra in  derailed near Terrace on Tuesday; th i s  f a c t  
was not passed on t c  any other agency, not even to the 
police. (Scanlon and Taylor, 1979, 18, 21) 
Eventually, al l  these incidents started to  mount  up and late 
Wednesday, November 6 ,  into early Thursday, November 2 ,  the roof quite 
l i te ra l ly  f e l l  in: 
CNR records showed tha t  high water, s l ides ,  bridges f loaded, 
trees on the track .. .washouts. ..the rcad bed washed 
away .. .(highways) one a f t e r  the other,  twenty-f ive bridges 
were lost or damaged beyond repair. For the highway 
department, i t  was a catastrophe.. . (Scanlon and Taylor, 
1979, 43) 
There were also two breaks in the natural gas pipeline,  some power and 
telephone problems, and flooding in three nearby ccmmunities -- New 
Remo, Old Remc, and Lakelse Lake. By Thursday morning in Lakelse Lake: 
The water was so high -- a cabin was tipped over, appliar,ces 
in basements near t o  the Lake were flooded , boats floated 
off the i r  t r a i l e r s .  . .A t  one home, f if teen people gathered on 
the second f loo r ,  sleeping on the f loo r ,  eating sandwiches, 
hoping the water would not r i se  too far  ... they had to see by 
candlelight. (Scanlon and Taylor, 1979, 72) 
How were a l l  these problems shared? How was the overall situation 
identified as a disaster? This was a resul t  of the work of one agency 
--the media, CFTK Terrace television and especial ly radio. 
I t  was the media t h a t  f i r s t  called the attention to the 
police t o  the extent of the flooding a t  Lakelse Lake 
promoting the 1 imited PEP (Provincial Emergency Program) 
response ... I t  was the media that  alerted the public about 
the breakdown on the  highways, and the  collapse of the r a i l  
line. I t  was the media, by carrying all  these accounts, t ha t  
convinced many in the area there was a real disaster .  
(Scanlon and Taylor, 1979, 72) 
As the incident developed, the media not only reported about what i t  
had gathered on i t s  own in i t i a t ive ,  i t  also reported what others were 
te l l ing  i t .  
The gas company ca l l e r  announced gas problems.. .The power 
company reported i t s  d i f f i cu l t i e s .  ..the phone ccmpany 1 isted 
i t s  problem areas ... The RCMP reported specific problems -- 
including highway closures --and even invited the media into 
i ts  off ices to keep up-to-dzte. ..PEP kept the media we1 1 
infcrmed about i t s  opewtions even to the point of using the 
media tc invite individuals t o  phone in if they needed help. 
The weather off ice kept the media repeatedly informed about 
the weather ... (Scanlon and Taylor, 1979, 72) 
Because a l l  these agencies were communicating through the media -- b u t  
not necessarily directly to each other -- the media were n o t  only the 
pub1 i c ' s  source of information, they were also the 1 ink among the 
various agencies as well : 
The media thus became the key element, keeping the communi - 
t i e s ,  and, equal ly isportant, the key response agencies, 
informed about what was happening overall. (Scanlon and 
Taylor, 1979, 73) 
While the media identif,ied t h a t  there was a disaster in the Ter- 
race area, they did not identify all  aspects of the disaster. They 
reported the flooding, the damage, the disaster response. They did not 
-- except in one case -- cover the equally serious economic problems. 
The flooding washed away logs, tore down ut i l i ty  1 ines and closed 
some logging camps fcr more than tno  weeks. Lcggers lost about a 
quarter of a mil lion do1 lars in wages. The highway breaks halted buses 
and truck t raff ic  and left  some trapped loads, perishable foods, Spoil- 
ing. Suppliers were forced to ship by a i r  or barge a t  higher Cost. 
The rail break isolated Prince Rupert, the nearest Canadian port 
to  the Crient. The harbour lost substantial business. Shippers had t o  
divert ocean traffic t o  Vancouver. 
The pipe1 ine problem put one Prince Rupert firm out of action. I t  
forced two huge f inns at Kitimat t o  cut to day shifts. Some ltanber 
companies were forced t c  close their kilns and ship green lumber west 
via the Panama Canal instead of east by rai l .  
Despite a1 1 these problems, the Terrace media ignored the overall 
economic situation before, during, and after the event The media 
decided what  should be reported : 
The Terrace disaster was presented by a flood situation t h a t  
damaged highways, rail  l ines, and other u t i l i t i es  and l e f t  
persons with damaged homes. I t  was not portrayed as an 
econcmic disaster for the area or for  individuals. (Scanlon, 
1980b, 261) 
LIMITS ON MEDIA POWER 
-- - - - -
I t  seems clear -- frcm the evidence in a l l  three studies --that 
the media can define an event as a d isas ter  (Terrace), can determine 
what shape and form and whose version will be accepted (Miramichi) and 
can provide advice and guidance as t o  what t o  do (London). The media 
may also be the 1 ink among the various response agencies (Terrace) and 
may -- because of the  impact of i t s  messages -- convince local of f i -  
c ia ls  to respond to i t s  questions (London). I t  may also decide what 
aspects of an incident t o  ignore (Terrace). Yet there are some limits 
on media power and some potential ccntrcls. 
Scme communities do not have local media and the media can not 
therefore play a key role in disaster respor,se. In Port Alice, B.C., 
fo r  example, a town par t ia l ly  evacuated because of a mudslide, there i s  
no local radio or T.V. (Scanlon, Jefferson and Sproat, 1976). Other 
communities, even if they have media in normal times, find themselves 
without media as a result  of disasters. This happened in Woodstock, 
Ontario, during a tornado. 
Faced with the  breakdown a t  the ( local )  radio stat ion -- the 
problems with the transmitter were n o t  fixed. ..at a l l  tha t  
night -- the  police made ca l l s  t o  other nearby stat ions.  
(Scanlcn, 1980c, 27) 
Media power may also be reduced by the  fac t  some persons -- those 
respcnding t o  the emergency, pol ice, f i r e ;  ambulance, hospital, emer- 
gency measures u t i l i t i e s  -- and some others,  those affected,  the vic- 
tims, may have l i t t l e  contact with the media. Damage may reduce the i r  
ab i l i t y  t o  receive broadcasts. Emergency relocation may take them away 
frcm the media. (Come of the evacuees in Courtenay, British Colunbia, 
complained tha t  when they t r i ed  to  follow the advice they were given t o  
l isten t o  the radio they could n o t  because they did not have access t o  
a radic ). The media power can also be reduced if i t s  broadcasts are 
n o t  understood because of language. "In Bathurst.. .where there i s  a 
large proportion of French.. .the probabi 1 i ty  ' of learning from 
radio.. . is much lower.. .. (The radio station broadcasts in English)" 
(Scanlon Dixon and McClellan, 1980, 10). 
Another res t ra in t  cn media power i s  the fac t  that  high speed wcrd 
of mouth communication 1 inks may precede media reports and, in a sense, 
beat the media to the punch. These have been described and analyzed in 
a number of studies. (See Scanlon, 1976, 104 - 119; Ericson e t  a l ,  
1978, 71 - 87; Singer, Osborne and Geschwenden, 1970). 
The impact of the media -- as a separate decision-making body --is  
also reduced when emergency response is quick and co-ordinated. In 
Sydney, Nova Scotia, a f t e r  a windstorm (October 20, 1974) the emergency 
response centre, established even before the storm abated, maintained a 
very close Link with the one surviving radio s ta t ion ,  CJCB. 
The d i r e c t o r  of CJCB c a r r i e d  a number of emergency announce- 
ments by the mayor, t h e  d i r e c t o r  of EMO...and responded t o  
each spec ia l  request  by broadcasting t h e  informat ion,  
reccrding i t  and repeat ing i t .  ( Je f fe r son  and Scanlon,  
1974, 10) 
The same s o r t  of con t ro l  showed up in  a snowstorm in Pr ince Edward 
County, Ontario.  The Survey showed t h a t :  
... more than f i f t y - f i v e  per c e n t  o f  t h o s e  who sa id  they 
scught information sa id  they scught i t  f r a n  t h e  media --and 
ninety- three  per cen t  of those  who s a i d  they turned t c  
radio  ... they had one s t a t i o n  in mind CJW in Be l l e -  
v i l  le.. .eighty-one per cen t  named CJBQ. (Scanlon and 
Taylor ,  42) 
While t h a t  may seem l i k e  enormous power t o  t h e  media, t h e  s tudy a l s o  
showed t h a t  CJBQ was depending on the Ontario Provincia l  Po l i ce  (OPP). 
What t h e  pub l i c  was t o l d  was what t h e  OPP wanted t o  hear.  
Radio, on t h e  whole, did n o t  chase i t s  own s t o r i e s .  ..in t h e  
case  cf Prince Edward County, t h i s  d id  not  work out t o o  
badly s ince  t h e  OPP was t h e  best  informed agency and i t s  
information was not  inaccurate .  (Scanlon and Taylor ,  43)  
I t  could be argued t h a t  some of t h i s  is new. All t h e  media a r e  
doing in a c r i s i s  is what they  always do. They a r e  tu rn ing  a c r i s i s  
in to  a rou t ine  a f f a i r .  "One man's rou t ine  of work i s  made up of t h e  
emergencies of o t h e r  people" (Hughes, 1951 , 316; see a l s o  Scanlon and 
Alldred,  1982, 13 - 19). They a r e  perfcrming t h e i r  normal funct ion of 
gatekeeping a s  they  always do (Waxman, 1973). They a r e  determining t h e  
agenda, determining what i s  important (KcCanbs and Shaw, 1973), a s  they 
always do. Nothing unusual i s  happening (Emerson, 1972). Russel 1 
Dyne's desc r ip t ion  cf  nedia problems in a c r i s i s ,  a desc r ip t ion  of what 
we have covered i n  d e t a i l  i n  t h e s e  c a s e s ,  may be simply a desc r ip t ion  
of ncrmality.  
A s p e c i f i c  s t a t i o n  may be given announcements f o r  t h e  pub l i c  
f r a n  several  d i f f e r e n t  organizat ions .  Some of t h e s e  
announcements may be contradic tory. .  .they have t o  make 
advice of what to broadcast ... in e f f e c t  t o  make pol icy by 
t h i s  s e l e c t i o n .  (Dynes, 1970, 191) 
In f a c t  such r o u t i n i z a t i m  is what we have argued elsewhem. This 
t ime ,  however, we would argue -- no. In a c r i s i s  t h e  usual means of 
communication -- te lephone,  p r i v a t e  r ad io  systems e t c  . , -- a r e  o f t en  
d i s rup ted .  In a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  na tu re  and shape of a community may be 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y  a l t e r e d  by a d i s a s t e r .  Pre-exis t ing ccmmunication sys- 
tems,  including normal s o c i a l  systems -- may no longer funct ion (ima- 
gine  t r y i n g  to f ind  a neighbor a f t e r  you have j u s t  been evacuated f r a n  
Mississauga).  In t h e  wake of a c r i s i s ,  t h e  media a r e  no t  just one way 
cf passing wrong information, they may be the only way. There are also 
limited ways to check the re l iabl i ty  of the tr!edie message. 
Peoplearevulnerable. Themedia ' sabi l i ty  t o d e f i n e a d i s a s t e r ,  
determine whose definition is  acceptable and disburse advice i s  far  
more acceptable than a t  other times. And i t ' s  especially important 
when i t  i s  considered how people closely attend t o  media during a 
c r i s i s  situation. Finally i t ' s  impcrtant because the messages are 
c r i t i ca l :  they call for imrrediate acticm. We argue -- as we have 
argued before --that communication i s  central t o  c r i s i s  response : 
To the considerable extent, whoever controls ccmmunications , 
whoever controls access to information, whoever i s  the 
source of information becomes the centre of operations. 
(Scanlon, 1982, 16) 
In a c r i s i s  that  "whoever" i s  often the mass mecia, especially 
radio. The centrality of media was driven home recently when the 
Barrie area of Ontario was h i t  by devastating tornadoes. All local 
media were knocked off the a i r .  Outside media (mainly fran Toronto) 
had difficulty getting informat ion by telephone -- lines were down or 
jammed --and difficulty getting access by road -- transportation was 
disrupted. Persons in the area,  anxious t o  find the overall shape of 
the disaster ,  kept calling Toronto asking what was happening. The 
media could only repcrt they did not know. 
The Barrie example i l lus t ra tes  once again the point of th i s  ar- 
t i c l e .  Persons turn t o  media in moments of c r i s i s  in order t o  get a 
definition of events. That need makes media f a r  more important than in 
normal times when other sources of information are available. 
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